

# **National Lead Force Performance Report**

Q1: April – June 2023



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## **Performance Assessment**

The dashboard provides an assessment of City of London Police (CoLP) performance against the National Lead Force (NLF) aims and objectives as set out in the National Lead Force Plan 2020-2023 (NLF Plan). The NLF Plan was approved by the City of London Police Authority in October 2020. The Plan sets out how CoLP will improve the national response to fraud. It reflects NLF's contribution and commitment to the National Fraud Policing Strategy and the National Economic Crime Centre's (NECC) five-year strategy. The NECC leads the 'whole system' effort to drive down growth in fraud on behalf of the UK Government.

The NLF plan sets out five outcomes that City of London Police is seeking to achieve: -

Outcome 1	Supporting and safeguarding victims	We provide a service for victims that is accessible, user-friendly and easy to engage with, and we successfully support and safeguard victims.			
Outcome 2	Disrupt fraudsters	We disrupt fraudsters that operate domestically and from overseas in order to make it harder for them to commit crime here in the UK.			
Outcome 3	Investigate and prosecute	We successfully lead the local to national policing response in investigating and prosecuting fraudsters, ensuring better outcomes for victims.			
Outcome 4 Raise awareness and prevent crime		We raise awareness of the threat and prevent fraud impacting people and businesses.			
I DUTCOME S. I. KIIIIMING CANANIIITIES I		As National Lead Force we work creatively and with partners to improve capabilities to tackle fraud across policing and the wider system.	<b>→</b>		



The grading criteria can be found in Appendix A – Performance Assessment Criteria



## **Executive Summary**

Γ	Outcome 1		Outcome 2		Outcome 3		Outcome 4		Outcome 5	
S	Supporting and safeguarding victims		Disrupt fraudsters		Investigate and prosecute		Raise awareness and prevent crime		Building capabilities	
A. B. C. E. F. G.	Action Fraud phone satisfaction improved due to faster speed of answer and lower call waiting. Online satisfaction consistent.  Lower levels of NECVCU repeat victims in Q1.  Increase in no. forces supported by NECVCU and consistent escalations.  100% Vulnerable Person Alerts sent in 7 days.  31% highly likely reports reviewed in 28 days, with disseminations increasing.  100% victim updates sent.  96% cyber reports disseminated by the target 7 days.  80% of live cyber incidents responded to in 2 hours due to 1 exception.  95% Protect advice sent in 72 hrs Number of Recall alerts sent above 22/23 average.	А. В. С.	The number of disruptions against OCGs were in line with the 22/23 average.  Total disruptions against OCGs and SOC strategic vulnerabilities surpassed both Q1 22/23 and the quarterly average.  Proportionally, Q1 saw an equal number of Major disruptions to OCGs from the 22/23 average, and an increase in Moderates.  The number and particularly value of POCA activities increased from 22/23 and included cryptocurrency.  Disruptions against cyber enablers fell overall from Q4 22/23, however, volumes do fluctuate and are expected to rise.	A.  B.  C.	of CoLP outcomes in Q1 22/23 outcomes in Q1 23/24 were low. However due to fluctuations in reporting throughout the year, it is expected that this will improve over the next few quarters.  All 45 forces remained compliant in reporting their outcomes.	В.	The number of social media posts was higher than any quarter in 22/23 showing a broad range of messaging across all teams.  The related impressions are equal to the 22/23 quarterly average.  In addition, 17 press releases were issued.  Two very successful campaigns were run, targeting both romance fraud and courier fraud, working with partners to drive prevention activity.  Additional two Protect campaigns focused on holiday fraud and phishing, raising the public's awareness.	A. B. C. D.	ECCA provided more courses to an increased number of delegates compared to Q1 2022/23.  ECCA satisfaction was slightly below target but expected to improve.  NLF demonstrated a wide range of collaborations in Q1.  PECT teams staffing moved closer to the end of year target, and teams demonstrated positive results in the period.	
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



The grading criteria can be found in Appendix A – Performance Assessment Criteria

**NLF Role:** We provide a service for victims that is accessible, user-friendly and easy to engage with, and we successfully support and safeguard victims.

#### **Success Measures:**

- A. To provide a consistent level of satisfaction with the Action Fraud telephone reporting service.
- B. To provide a consistent level of satisfaction with the Action Fraud online reporting service.





Since the launch of the current victim satisfaction survey, Action Fraud advisors have provided a consistently good service. Overall, 1% of those reporting a crime in Q1 opted to provide satisfaction feedback to the confirmation fulfilment survey. Over 1.82M confirmation survey links have been delivered to date with over 20k respondents (1%) opting to provide satisfaction feedback including free text responses, which are used to continuously improve our service.

Telephone Reporting Service - In order to provide a consistent level of satisfaction with the telephone reporting service, Action Fraud have implemented several improvements to enhance the user journey and accessibility into the service, such as Language Line and the Sign Video reporting option for Deaf users. The Advisor XP Contact Centre tool was also launched in Q1, a chat bot style tool offering advisers real time support, to ensure that victims are provided with correct advice and referrals. These are expected to improve the quality of calls and reduce call waiting and handling times, which should in turn increase victim satisfaction.

Q1 saw a significant uplift in contact centre staff numbers which resulted in an upward turn in performance and a reduction in call abandonment to 33% from 49% the previous quarter. The additional staff have answered just under 20k additional calls compared to Q4 22/23. Call handling times have reduced by 8% from Q4 to an average of 21.74 minutes, and the average speed of answer has reduced by 50% to 8.83 minutes. The average speed to abandonment in Q1 was 5.94 compared to the previous quarter's average of 8.90 minutes. The increase in staffing alongside shift, training pattern and management changes is anticipated to reduce the call abandonment rate over time. In the reporting period there have been days when the target abandonment rate of 16% has been reached for the first time ever.

The Action Fraud confirmation survey looks at call handler knowledge, victim satisfaction with the service provided by the contact centre advisor, and the speed of answer. Feedback to this survey in Q1 indicates that satisfaction with the telephone reporting service remains stable and within target at 96%. This is a slight improvement on Q1 of FY 22/23 which saw a satisfaction rate of 95%. Overall satisfaction levels in this area remain high over the long term.

Online Reporting Service - Action Fraud are unable to make any changes to the current website, however a new reporting tool is currently in development and should launch early next year. It is anticipated that the new reporting system will bring online satisfaction in line with telephone satisfaction. In the short term, new facilities such as a webchat and chat bot have been added, improving victim satisfaction through the provision of support and guidance, assisting the victim through the self-reporting process. This increases the capacity of the advisors, enabling them to answer more calls and give more time to supporting vulnerable callers.

**NLF Role:** We provide a service for victims that is accessible, user-friendly and easy to engage with, and we successfully support and safeguard victims.


#### **Success Measures:**

- C. To reduce the level of repeat victimisation after NECVCU contact.
- D. To ensure victims feel safer and more confident after NECVCU contact, with reduced emotional harm and improved sense of safety.
- E. To improve consistency of victim support across all police forces.



The National Economic Crime Victim Care Unit (NECVCU) supports forces at a local level, delivering care to victims of fraud and cyber-crime, allowing for a consistent and national standard of care and support.


The **Level 1** service gives Protect/Prevent advice to non-vulnerable victims of fraud. The **Level 2** service engages with victims when vulnerability is identified, and by giving crime prevention advice and signposting to local support services helps the victim to cope and recover from the fraud.




Repeat Victims – In Q1 the definition of a repeat victim became "a second or subsequent report by a victim of fraud who has had previous contact with NECVCU within a rolling 12-month period" whereas before there was no time limit. During the period there were 6 victims identified as repeat victims, down from the 2022/23 quarterly average of 26. In Q1 both services engaged with a total of 12,683 victims, meaning the 6 repeat victims represent 0.05% of victim contacts.

**Victims feel safer** – A victim survey has been launched, which measures whether victims feel safer and more confident after contact with an Advocate. Results are expected to begin to be available from Q2.

Consistent Support – The NECVCU now supports 41 forces in England and Wales at level 1 and following a significant staff uplift in May, provides 35 forces with an additional service at level 2 (formerly 6 forces), with talks to onboard more in the future. Escalations to provide additional service(s) to support vulnerable victims following interaction with NECVCU has remained relatively consistent in the period.







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
#### **Success Measures:**

- F. To review and, where appropriate, disseminate vulnerable person alert within 7 days.
- G. To review and respond to all allegations of fraud that meet 'highly likely' or 'likely vulnerable' on the solvability matrix, within 28 days.
- H. To provide an NFIB outcome to all victims, within 28 days.




**Vulnerable Person Alerts** – To identify potentially vulnerable victims, searches are run on all reports of fraud, looking for under 18s, and agreed 'risky words' which highlight a vulnerability risk for the victim – such as suicide, mental health, or threats to life.

In Q1, the search found 2,202 reports that came from vulnerable victims. Over the quarter, 84% of alerts were sent within the target of 72 hours, with a high of 99% in May. 100% of alerts were sent to forces for victim support within 7 days of the report being downloaded to the system



Priority Allegations — The process for prioritising which reports to review was developed in 2022. Rather than monetary thresholds, fraud reports are now assessed against a number of criteria to establish a 'solvability' score. Those 'highly likely' and 'likely' to be solved are prioritised for review.

During Q1, 31% of 'highly likely' and 41% of 'likely vulnerable' reports were reviewed within 28 days of reporting. During the quarter the overall volume of disseminations rose from 2,622 in April, to 4,257 in June.



#### **Victim Contact regarding Outcomes**

100% of fulfilment letters were dispatched to victims within 48 hours of the request being received.

The NFIB has multiple advice letters, tailored to each fraud type, which are emailed to victims on a weekly basis. This service is known as 'Send in Blue'. In August 2021, this process was automated, and the success rate went from a low of 59% in June to an average of 99.69% for the rest of 2021/22.

In Q1 23/24, the success rate of Send in Blue was also 100%.




**NLF Role:** We provide a service for victims that is accessible, user-friendly and easy to engage with, and we successfully support and safeguard victims.

#### **Success Measures:**

- I. To review and disseminate all Action Fraud reports classified with an NFIB Cybercrime code, within 7 days of report creation.
- J. To respond to all live cybercrime reports, within 2 hours of reporting.
- K. All businesses reporting cyber enabled crime to receive Protect advice within 72 hours of receipt by the Protect Team.






**Cyber Reports** – In Q1, 7,848 reports were classified with a Cybercrime code, up 22.5% from the previous quarter.

Of these, 100% were disseminated for Protect or Pursue activity, 96% within the target 7-day period. Performance improved from 95% to 97% throughout the quarter.



Live Cyber Incidents — 44 live cyber incidents were recorded in Q1, and in April and May each one was reviewed, and a response sent within 2 hours. In June, for the first time in over a year, performance fell to 80%. This is due to two reports being received out of hours within minutes of each other, meaning that with one on-call crime reviewer there was a 7-minute delay to the second report being reviewed and disseminated. The majority of reports are reviewed and disseminated in less than 60 minutes.





**Protect Advice** – NFIB Business Protect provided protect advice to 433 organisations during Q1, up 15% from the previous quarter. 95% (418) of organisations received the advice within 72 hours of reporting to Action Fraud. This measure may have been affected by the high number of bank holidays within the reporting period.



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
#### **Success Measures:**

To help victims of fraud to prevent or recover losses through information sharing with the banking sector and support from victim care.

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The **NLF Victim Care Unit** is a unique team, which acts as a conduit between NLF Fraud Ops Investigations and their victims of fraud. NLF VCU ensure that the Victims Code Of Practice is complied with and address the welfare needs of victims by triaging out to support services. They also play a part in the Protect strand of the 4P plan by proactively offering prevention advice to stop revictimization, also disrupting OCG activity.


NLF VCU have an ongoing partnership with TrueCall who install call blocking devices for victims who receive high volumes of fraudulent calls. Volumes dropped in Q1 due to two units falling dormant, but a further two were issued during the quarter.




**Project RECALL** is an initiative to alert banks to accounts used in fraud. The process continues to function correctly, with the technical issues seen in 2022/23 resolved. This has resulted in an emerging baseline of just over 2,000 alerts being sent out each quarter with a value of £7-8 million. Overall alerts continue to be lower than the same period for 2021/22, however, the value of the alerts is higher. This is likely due to fraud reporting drawing closer to pre pandemic levels, with lower overall reporting but higher losses per report. With RECALL working correctly, volumes of alerts should continue to mirror trends in overall fraud reporting.

This quarter 2,023 account alerts were sent to banks, down 11% from Q4 22/23 (-273), however, this is a 61% improvement on Q1 22/23 when there were several technical issues. The value of Q1 alerts also fell slightly from £8,307,470 to £7,166,946. The system for banks to confirm the value of repatriated funds is not automated, and although the banks were proactively asked for feedback none responded in Q1.

The number of disrupted bank accounts has been rising since the inception of the project and the initiative allows not only for funds to be returned to victims but also disrupts fraudsters, demonstrates good partnership working, and provides CoLP with the ability to start an investigation early if an alert is missed by the banks.








### Outcome 2: Disrupt Fraudsters.


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
#### **Success Measures:**

- A. To sustain the level of National Lead Force disruptions against Organised Crime Groups and Strategic Vulnerabilities.
- B. To increase the proportion of Major and Moderate disruptions.









There are currently 77 mapped **Organised Crime Groups (OCGs)** under investigation by National Lead Force teams. Four new OCGs were mapped in the quarter, and three were archived.

There were **18 disruptions** claimed against NLF OCGs in Q1, which is a 34% decrease compared to the 26 in Q4, although it is in line with the quarterly average from 2022/23. A Major disruption represents the OCG being fully dismantled or impacted at a key player level. There have been 3 major disruptions for Q1, and 11 moderate. There were an additional 145 disruptions against Serious Organised Crime strategic vulnerabilities throughout the period.

Activity against OCGs is not consistent and depends on a number of factors, including resources, capacity, and criminal activity. It is worth noting that approximately 35 of the active operations are Tier 4 investigations, meaning they are **awaiting court results** and/or are in their final stages before being archived. This means no further operational activity is planned against them and the only disruption left to claim is a Major once sentences are delivered. There have been many adjourned NLF cases in the last year, mostly due to Covid backlogs and barrister strikes.

#### **Notable Major Disruptions**

The **Fraud Ops** team secured a 14-year prison sentence for a criminal who ran a Ponzi-style investment scam worth over £70m. The suspect offered over 300 victims returns of 60% on foreign exchange markets. The suspect absconded part way through his trial and his whereabouts are still unknown. In his absence he was found guilty of 7 counts of fraud by false representation, fraudulent trading and money laundering.

Three suspects in a **PIPCU** investigation were convicted and sentenced to suspended sentences and unpaid work. Following the investigation evidence has been seen that their shops selling counterfeit goods have closed, and they now have legitimate employment.

The organisers of an **IFED** OCG were given a caution or served Cease and Desist orders. One nominal agreed to pay back the circa £7k he fraudulently took from Aviva.




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
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
#### **Success Measures:**

C. To increase the use of POCA powers to freeze, restrain and protect proceeds of crime.









#### **Use of POCA Powers**

In Q1, Operational Fraud teams and Funded Units carried out 23 POCA activities. This is above the 2022/23 quarterly average of 15 and the Q4 total of 16. Most of the activity focused on confiscations (10) and asset restraining orders (7). The greatest value came in May, with three asset restraints carried out by PIPCU totalling £6.75 million. Additionally, the teams worked to ensure that Courts awarded 8 victims £315,295 compensation, which is above the 2022/23 benchmark.

#### **Seizure of Cryptocurrency**

PIPCU completed their first confiscation of cryptocurrency this quarter. The case involved a hacker who infiltrated numerous high profile artists' personal accounts, to steal items including unreleased songs and sell them for cryptocurrency. Working with the UK Digital Currency Exchange PIPCU officers were able to freeze the digital currency. Following conviction, the court ordered the confiscation order of 2.64522195 BTC which was transferred to fiat currency of £59,935.

#### **Notable POCA Activities**

This quarter saw **PIPCU**'s highest POCA seizures, as a result of early restraints being obtained on all assets connected to suspects in two cases. The first is an investigation into the sale of counterfeit goods which are detrimental to public health, by a husband and wife who arrived in the UK in 2021 on a spousal visa. The suspected benefit figure could run into £6m with a current restraint order £1.03m. The subjects have used 30 different names resulting in 138 bank accounts so far identified. The second case is the investigation into illegal IPTV streaming involving the top tier, which includes a father and son and an in-law. Similarly, the suspected benefit figure runs over £4m with a restraint order of £1.68m. There are 86 accounts so far identified.

In May, **IFED** obtained an account freezing order of £459,762 regarding a company who had incepted 390 life/critical illness insurance policies using false details, and fraudulently claimed over £1.07m of commission. The OIC obtained the AFO to freeze the accounts before the funds could be dissipated. The sole director and owner of the company and had used the funds to purchase a holiday wedding in Cancun, a new BMW, and a Rolex Watch from his business account which amounts to money laundering.




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
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
#### **Success Measures:**

D. To increase the identification and disruption of cyber enablers to curtail criminality and protect victims.









#### **Notable Disruptions**

**DCPCU** saw high numbers of bank account disruptions due to two investigations into account takeovers by organised crime groups. A suspect who is currently in prison was interviewed and revealed that a mobile phone in their possession during the offending period was still in his property. The device was seized and examined revealing thousands of sets of compromised account details, which were shared with UK Finance to safeguard accounts and identify offending. In another investigation, two bank insider suspects were identified, arrested and interviewed. Their devices were seized and compromised account data found. This was shared with UK Finance to protect the accounts.

NFIB's Prevention and Disruption team (P&D) identified and disrupted 20 suspicious email addresses set up by a trading company in a sophisticated investment fraud where adverts for investment training were placed on social media sites. Tuition included fake videos in the name of money expert Martin Lewis to legitimise the company. On signing up, victims were subjected to high pressure sales tactics to invest funds for trading purposes. At the point of final withdrawal, contact would be withdrawn, and funds withheld. Reported losses at point of disruption were £2.6mil. P&D also assisted Sir James Dyson with a case of multiple websites set up to commit crypto based investment fraud. The company used social media to attract investors, attaching fake Times news articles using his name to recommend them. P&D were able to take these sites down when Sir Dyson's legal team were unable to.

During Q1, a total of 8,087 disruptions to technological enablers were recorded, lower than the Q4 22/23 quarterly average of 20,308, but almost double than the Q1 22/23 total of 4,259.

Volumes of disruptions fluctuate throughout the year according to operational priorities and intensifications.

### City of London Police and National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) Suspicious Email Reporting Service (SERS) and Takedowns

The public are sent large volumes of scam messages every day, many of which will be blocked by spam filters or otherwise ignored. NCSC and CoLP receive reporting of suspicious emails from the public via SERS, which launched on 21st April 2020. As of 30th June 2023, the number of reports received stands at more than 21,981,000 with the removal of more than 133,000 scams across 242,600 URLs.


In Q1 there were over 29,230 suspicious emails reported per day to NCSC and CoLP, in addition to around 888 cyber-enabled crimes reported by victims to Action Fraud.


## **Outcome 3:** Investigate and Prosecute.

**NLF Role:** We successfully lead the local to national policing response in investigating and prosecuting fraudsters, ensuring better criminal justice outcomes for victims.

#### **Success Measures:**

- A. To increase the number of judicial outcomes recorded nationally by Policing.
- B. To increase the number of judicial outcomes recorded by City of London Police.
- C. To maintain the level of Home Office forces in the compliant category for reporting at 100%.





The total outcomes reported in a period can relate to disseminations from any time frame. The volume of outcomes is expected to fluctuate throughout the year as cases with varying numbers of crimes attached are seen in courts. For example, one investigation into a boiler room might have hundreds of outcomes attached to it and closing the case will give many outcomes, potentially bringing closure to multiple victims.


Note: Judicial outcomes refer to Home Office Counting Rules Outcomes 1-8 which include charges, cautions, taken into consideration etc. (they do not refer to the wider criminal justice process).

FY 23/24 FYTD	No. Forces
Compliant (2-3 Returns)	45
Partially Compliant (n/a)	0
Non Compliant (0-1 Returns)	0

Forces are required to provide outcome information to CoLP every month, matched against their NFIB disseminations. In Q1, all forces provided their return each month. The National Coordinators Office (NCO) continue to engage with forces to ensure compliance is maintained.

Nationally, Q1 2023/24 judicial outcomes are broadly in line with the comparative period for the prior year. Significant contributions were made by Merseyside, Northumbria and Lancashire, who collectively contributed 250 judicial outcomes (16% nationally). This can be attributed to continued engagement by the NCO in its engagement and holding forces to accountnot only though Regional Strategic Governance Groups, but also though the Economic Crime Policing Board and the monthly performance reports that all forces now receive following the HMICFRS Time to Choose recommendations.

**CoLP** Judicial outcomes are down by 218 or 92% in Q1 2023/24 compared to the prior year. This is primarily due to the Fraud teams undertaking a sweeping exercise of old Judicial outcomes last year. They finalised 186 in total through this process, and in addition one large NLF operation yielded 23 Judicial outcomes in this period.



### **Outcome 3:** Investigate and Prosecute.

**NLF Role:** We successfully lead the local to national policing response in investigating and prosecuting fraudsters, ensuring better criminal justice outcomes for victims.

#### **Success Measures:**

D. Through leadership of LFOR improve the coordination of Operational Activity across Policing to increase Pursue outcomes for victims.


#### **National and International Coordination and Assistance**

LFOR assisted other Forces and Regions with **4 requests for assistance** during Q1 2023/24. The requests were for arrests, warrants to be executed, supporting premises searches, gathering of evidence, as well as victim management. This is a key role of LFOR who provide Operational and Investigative support to all UK Forces and Regions to progress cases with enquiries in London. A high number of OCG activity that impacts victims across the country have links to London, and by providing such support LFOR are supporting partners in expediting positive outcomes and disruption opportunities.

LFOR received and developed **10 cases** that were subject of **Case Acceptance Plans** for consideration by NLF Operations. This compares to 9 cases the previous quarter.

There have also been **43** International requests for assistance from Foreign Law Enforcement Agencies. These are managed within LFOR, and during this quarter the highest number of requests were again from Poland. The average time for completion for Q1 was 32 days which is well within the 90-day target.

LFOR coordinate the activity of the regional **Proactive Economic Crime Teams** and monitor their performance against agreed KPIs. During Q1 the PECT carried out 49 arrests, 25 voluntary interview and 170 alternat outcomes. They also submitted 196 intelligence reports and seized assets valued at £625,372.00 . The PECT were all involved in Op Dupers targeting Courier Fraud in May.







### Outcome 4: Raise Awareness and Prevent Crime.

**NLF Role:** We raise awareness of the threat and prevent fraud impacting people and businesses.


#### **Success Measures:**


- A. To increase the number of Social Media posts.
- B. To increase the reach of Social Media posts (impressions).



Across the various teams engaging on social media, the number of confirmed posts (457) and related impressions (3.2 million) rose from Q4 22/23. Action Fraud has engaged with new platforms, with 4.5k followers on Instagram, and is now active and verified on the Threads social media platform. The NFIB Protect Team have had issues providing social media reach and impression data, so their campaign details will be discussed on the next slide.

During the quarter, the Media Team oversaw 17 press releases and 2 interviews. Compared to the previous quarter, this represents a decrease for interviews, however a significant increase for press releases. The interviews included a filmed section for BBC One's Caught Red Handed (to air in August) and background for an article on luxury counterfeit goods with The Guardian. Press releases received coverage in local, national and trade media and included the rise in opportunistic insurance fraud, an IPTV sentencing, a warrant executed with Amazon, a fraudulent pet insurance sentencing, and a suspect going on the run after being sentenced. A press release was also issued announcing the new suppliers appointed for Action Fraud.





#### **Notable Social Media Campaigns**

**IFED** issued press releases on social media regarding a sentencing about fraudulent income protection policies, and to promote the repayment of a confiscation order. They also supported Insurance Fraud Bureau campaigns on crash for cash moped scams and opportunistic insurance fraud.

The **NLF Operational Teams** posted further messaging regarding Hajj fraud, supported the Action Fraud ticket fraud campaign, and launched a Courier Fraud campaign with a press release around over 70s being disproportionately targeted.

Press releases were issued by **PIPCU** following three people sentenced for running an illicit counterfeit goods shop in Manchester with over £1m worth of fake designer goods seized. Also, after PIPCU secured a confiscation order against a hacker who was jailed in October 2022.



### Outcome 4: Raise Awareness and Prevent Crime.

**NLF Role:** We raise awareness of the threat and prevent fraud impacting people and businesses.

#### **Success Measures:**

C. To deliver campaigns and participate in intensification periods to raise awareness and drive prevention activity.



#### **NLF: Romance Fraud Campaign**

June saw the end of the 6-month NLF romance fraud campaign in partnership with CrimeStoppers. This used established CrimeStoppers platforms to deliver Protect messaging to communities and organisations. The products were sent to 74 agencies including Neighbourhood Watch, adult safeguarding services and safer community partnerships. The campaign received 8.1 million impressions, media interest and was promoted by the On-line Dating Association.

The content and graphical representation showing the true meaning behind fraudsters' messages was well received and shared across many partner organisations with the social media posts generating a wide range of responses.

The total audience reach is approximately 92.3 million and the relationship with CrimeStoppers has proven to be valuable in supporting national Protect messaging to assist with the safeguarding of vulnerable victims. DCI Parish has approached the NECC to discuss funding opportunities for this year to support other fraud related initiatives.

#### **LFOR: Courier Fraud**

Op Dupers was a proactive operation to target courier fraudsters and disrupt them from committing fraud against vulnerable and predominantly elderly victims. The LFOR led operation was undertaken with support from the NECC, NFIB, IDT, ROCUs, and local forces including the Met.

The participation and engagement was excellent and during the intensification, a number of successful outcomes and significant intelligence were identified.

#### **NFIB Protect and Action Fraud**

During the 21/22 reporting period, Action Fraud received 6,457 reports, amounting to over £15m lost to **Holiday Fraud**. During May, the NFIB Protect team delivered a social media campaign to raise awareness of this threat. This campaign built on behaviours delivered during the online shopping/Cyber Aware campaign and aligned to the new fraud/cyber communications toolkit. The campaign reached an estimated 6.4m individuals, achieving over 22.8m impressions.

During June, the Protect network delivered its annual **phishing awareness** campaign. The campaign reached 6.1m individuals, achieving over 14.1m impressions. The campaign aimed to raise awareness of reporting suspicious emails to report@phishing.gov.uk and reporting suspicious text messages to 7726. As of June 2023, the number of reports received stands at 21m, with 133k scams being removed across 242,600 URLs. 18k scams have been removed as part of the 7726 service.







### Outcome 5: Building Capacity and Capability.

**NLF Role:** As National Lead Force we work creatively and with partners to improve capacity and capability committed to fighting fraud, both across policing and the wider system.

#### **Success Measures:**

- A. To increase delegate training levels in the Economic and Cybercrime Academy.
- B. To maintain delegate satisfaction levels at 90% or above.





#### **Training Courses**

The ECCA delivered 22 training courses in Q1. Although this is a decrease of 50% from Q4 22/23 it is a 15% increase from the 19 courses in Q1 of the previous year. Training levels are following the expected seasonal adjustment, as bookings are affected by budgets and bank holidays in Q1.

The number of delegates, 272, represents an increase of 23% from the same period of the previous year (221). This represents an ongoing year on year increase in the number of both courses and delegates.

This quarter, 75% of delegates were from UK policing, with remainder from the private sector.






The Academy delivered a Victim Care course for new Advocates in the NECVCU expansion, ensuring NLF staff have appropriate skills. Throughout Q1, other training was delivered to partner organisations, including Demystifying Cyber Crime to the Cabinet Office, and FIFC and SFI courses to SEROUC officers.

The Academy delivered a bespoke Introduction to Fraud course specifically designed for the FCA and the NCA were given a Bribery course. Feedback from both has been positive and early indication is they will request additional courses.

Satisfaction for the quarter averaged at 88% despite a drop to 78% in May. This was due to a free SFI course that was held externally. Several delegates felt it was not relevant to their role, and the facilities were unsuitable. Only 51% of feedback forms were returned during the quarter. This will be addressed by the training admin team for future courses.

Currently, the Academy asks for feedback on the course itself. In the future, a strategy will be instigated to contact delegates' managers following the course, to understand if the lessons learned have been implemented, and from both their perspectives, how the course has assisted them in their investigations.



### Outcome 5: Building Capacity and Capability.

**NLF Role:** As National Lead Force we work creatively and with partners to improve capacity and capability committed to fighting fraud, both across policing and the wider system.

#### **Success Measures:**

. To collaborate with industry and partners to develop innovative new ways to better protect victims and disrupt serious offending.



CoLP forms part of a multitude of **inter-agency groups** who tackle fraud and cybercrime in partnership. We work closely with a wide range of law enforcement and government agencies, banks and industry partners. In Q1 2023/24:

**IFED** worked with CPS lawyers and a FTSE 100 insurer to obtain an Account Freezing Order for £459k under POCA.

**PIPCU** continued its successful collaborations with World Intellectual Property Organization and Europol to disrupt pirate and copyright-infringing websites.

In May **PIPCU** worked with Sky to utilise a new tactic to disrupt illegal TV, utilising Sky expert knowledge.

The Intelligence Development Team, financed by Lloyds Banking Group used licenced demographic segmentation data to identify chronic hotspots of victimisation and forecast potential victimisation by location. Greater Manchester Police found that using the method devised reduced victim losses to romance fraud in hotspots by up to 100% over six months.



#### Spotlight on DCPCU and Lloyds Banking Group

Lloyds Banking Group has joined forces with the DCPCU to launch the industry's first pilot scheme using proceeds of crime to fund a national fraud fighting programme. The 'frozen' cash — which is money captured from fraudsters by the bank's specialist mule-hunting team — has been invested in several projects to tackle fraud.

One of these is expanding the DCPCU by funding a new specialist team to track down criminals through cyber investigations, which can lead to disrupting other illegal activity often associated with fraud such as drugs and people trafficking.

Research conducted to support this partnership revealed that a criminal's traditional weakness, 'cashing out' the crime, had become a strength as they are using cryptocurrency to disguise their transactions from financial institutions. Research also revealed that there were no pathways to proactively identify key threat actors. The DCPCU utilised the funding to develop an 'intensive cyber training pathway', exploiting the blockchain and identifying 'real world' touch points for criminals exploiting the perceived anonymity of cryptocurrency. These newly trained investigators were enabled to develop 3 key workstreams.

- Target criminals purchasing software to bypass financial institutions' authentications.
- Target criminals who were trading in stolen data purchased on the 'dark web'.
- Identify and target prolific fraudsters on encrypted messaging platforms.

This partnership enabled the development of a thorough digital strategy, including training staff to search for compromised customer data on devices seized from suspects and sharing it with industry to protect accounts and prevent further offending. In 2022 this new workstream demonstrated outstanding performance. The targets agreed with stakeholders were for the team to annually achieve £14.5m of savings to industry and seize £0.3m from the hands of criminals. As a result of this project, in 2022 (the projects first year), the development of these investigations enabled the new team to arrest 26 nominals, achieve 5 convictions, seize £0.89m from criminals, and save industry an estimated £35.3m by protecting thousands of customer accounts. As a result of this successful partnership the DCPCU are looking at incorporating their new team and working practices into their standard operating model.

### Outcome 5: Building Capacity and Capability.

**NLF Role:** As National Lead Force we work creatively and with partners to improve capacity and capability committed to fighting fraud, both across policing and the wider system.

#### **Success Measures:**

D. To improve the capacity to police fraud and cybercrime by implementing additional posts and improving attraction, recruitment and retention.



#### Establishment of a new Fraud Policing Network (PURSUE):


- There are 9 Regional Proactive Economic Crime Teams (PECTs) in place and enlargement of the London response (MPS and CoLP) is being implemented with DI already in post, and 2 DCs from CoLP, and 1 DS and 3 DC from the MPS.
- By the end of June 2023, 124 regional posts were in place across the network, representing 72% of the target by FYE 2023/24 (172 posts) achieved. This is across both the Police Uplift Programme and HMG Spending Review investment funding.
- Assessment of PECT operational performance is regularly monitored and a dashboard for regional accountability has been devised.
- The growth in investigative capacity in CoLP NLF Fraud Operations has resulted in 8 new Police Staff Investigators and a PSI Supervisor in place.
- 4 CoLP leadership posts are being recruited in 2023/24. A Communications lead is in place and a DI PECT Coordinator, Performance Lead and Intelligence Lead are being recruited.

#### Notable operational examples include:

**ERSOU** Enforcement at two properties culminating in recovery of £15k counterfeit and a large quantity of drugs. Enforcement undertaken in Birmingham of three suspects culminating in the charge and subsequent remand of two linked to a series of circa £40k CF offences. Multiple devices recovered, and a third suspect bailed.

**TARIAN** Dyfed Powys Police were subject to a number of courier fraud incidents. Charter work was conducted by Tarian PECT on the VC number and call data was obtained. On analysing the data returned, another possible victim was identified due to the amount of contact with the VC number. Dyfed Powys Economic Crime Team were then able to carry out an immediate response, which showed the offence was in process and prevented a loss of approximately £15,000.

**NWROCU** Postal fraud. A warrant was executed at an address in St Helens. Two Indian nationals were arrested at the address. Cash seizure and AFOs of approximately £10,000. No comment interviews and bailed.



## **Appendix A - Performance Assessment Criteria**

In order to identify if these outcomes are being achieved a series of success measures for each outcome have been produced and are reported on throughout the period. The success measures related to each outcome can be found at the start of each slide alongside the current assessment for the relevant measure. These have been identified based on the data available, and whether the data is increasing or decreasing within the required tolerance level.

Success Measure Performance Assessment				
•	A green upwards arrow suggests improvement in the direction of travel.			
<b>→</b>	A green arrow pointing right is used for consistent performance at 100%.			
•	A green arrow pointing down means a decreasing trend which is positive.			
<b>→</b>	Amber means there has been limited increases or decreases within tolerance level.			
•	A red downward arrow suggests a decrease in performance.			



